Proofs about system specifications are difficult to conduct, particularly for large specifications.
Introduction
Central to the formal development of systems is the construction of abstract specifications and the refinement of these specifications into more concrete designs. It is often the case that we need to show that the starting specification satisfies certain properties. These could be simple consistency checks (e.g. initialisation theorems) or other general properties (e.g. freedom of deadlock/divergence, in concurrent systems). Should these properties be preserved by the refinement steps, then proving them for the starting specification would mean they hold for the subsequent designs. However, these proofs are often difficult to conduct, particularly for large specifications. This paper proposes a proof technique that facilitates reasoning about system specifications. The idea is simple: treat the specification as a "design" of a yet more abstract model in which the proofs are much easier to conduct. To prove that a specification S satisfies a property P:
(i) Propose a more abstract model, say A, of S (ii) Show that P holds for A (iii) Show that S is a refinement of A Of course, the proofs justifying steps ii-iii should be much easier than the direct proof that P holds for S . Also, these steps implicitly assumes that the property P is preserved by the refinement relation in step iii.
In this paper, we apply the above proof-by-refinement technique to Circus [12] specifications. Although some of the properties verified are about concurrency, e.g. freedom from deadlock, all the proofs are conducted in Z. This is an interesting result in its own right, as Z and its tool support are traditionally limited to sequential programs. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to the Circus specification language. Section 3 describes the proof-by-refinement technique and applies it to two examples of different complexities. Finally, Section 4 discusses our experience with the proposed technique and draws the concluding remarks.
Circus
Circus is a unified programming language that combines Z and CSP constructs, together with specification statements [9] and guarded commands [6] . With Z and CSP integrated into the language, Circus can be used to describe both the state-oriented and the behavioural aspects of concurrent systems. Though there are several other examples of combining Z and CSP in the literature (see, for example, the survey in [7] ), Circus distinguishes itself by a theory of refinement [4, 5, 11] for the derivation of programs from their specifications in a calculational style like Morgan's [10] . Circus has a well-defined syntax and a formal semantics [12] , as well as various refinement laws for refinement [5] of specifications into designs/programs.
A Circus program is a sequence of:
In its simplest form, a process definition is a sequence of Z paragraphs describing the internal state, and a sequence of operations that describe possible changes in the state and/or interactions between the process and its environment. These operations are called actions, and are defined in terms of Z schemas, CSP operators, and guarded commands). In more sophisticated forms, a process may be defined in terms of combinations of other processes using the operators of CSP.
Example: A Protected Natural Number
We use Circus to model a simple process (ProtNat) that encapsulates, and provides mutual exclusive access to, a natural number. The process is depicted in Figure 1 and can be described as follows:
Global Definitions
Other processes, drawn from the given set ProcID, interact with ProtNat through three channels: write, read , and leave. A communication on the channel write (read ) represents the event where a process updates (reads) the data encapsulated in ProtNat. A communication on the channel leave represents the event when a process has finished its current writing (reading) operation to (from) ProtNat.
Process State
There are three components in the state of ProtNat.
• The data encapsulated, data, of type N.
• The set of readers, those processes currently reading from ProtNat.
• The set of writers, those processes currently writing to ProtNat.
As represented by the ProtNatState schema, there are two state invariants.
• Reading and writing are mutually exclusive.
• There must be no more than one writer.
Process Actions
The constituent actions of the process are (i) InitProtNatState: Initially there are no readers or writers, the encapsulated data is given an initial value d ?.
(ii) Update: This action is enabled only if there no current readers or writers. When enabled, the action is signalled by the input communication of a (iii) Retrieve: This action is enabled only if there is no current writer. When enabled, the action is signalled by the input communication of a process identifier and output of the current data value. The process becomes a reader.
(iv) WriterLeave: When a process has finished its current writing operation, it leaves ProtNat; this is signalled by the communication of the process identifier over the leave channel.
(v) ReaderLeave: When a process has finished its current reading operation, it leaves ProtNat; again, this is signalled by the communication of the process identifier over the leave channel.
(vi) ReactiveBehaviour: Repeatedly offers the external choice between Update, Retrieve, WriterLeave and ReaderLeave
The extensional behaviour of the process is given by its main action
InitProtNatState; ReactiveBehaviour
As a useful check on the consistency of the model, we finish this section by showing that an initial state exists for the ProtNat process. 
Proofs By Refinement
To prove that a Circus specification S satisfies a property P:
(i) Define an abstraction A that has the same structure and state components of S , with the same types and invariants. This abstraction can be obtained by removing existing guards, changing external choices into internal choices, and/or changing schema operations to unconstrained schemas.
(ii) Show that A satisfies the property P.
(iii) Using the refinement laws of Circus show that A S .
The idea, as shown by the examples below, is that the abstract model defined in step i would have a very simple structure that the proof in step ii would be simple, if not straightforward or obvious. Also, proving the side conditions of Circus laws in step iii should be easier than proving the direct conjecture that S satisfies P.
[ProcID]
channel read , write : ProcID × N channel leave : ProcID Figure 2 , the abstract model AProtNat has the same structure, state components, types and invariants as that of ProtNat. The abstract model also uses the same channels, and with similar actions to those defined in ProtNat. However, in AProtNat there are no guards, and state changes are unconstrained, provided the state invariant is maintained. Finally, the main action of the abstract model is the repeated nondeterministic choice between its actions, following the initialisation of the state.
Example 1: ProtNat is deadlock-free and divergence-free

Shown in
We now prove that AProtNat is deadlock-free and divergence-free. This implies that the actions of AProtNat maintain the state invariants, otherwise the process would not be divergence-free.
Theorem 3.1 If ProcID is nonempty, then the abstraction AProtNat is both deadlock-free and divergence-free.
Proof. By inspection of Circus syntax and semantics, there are eight conditions that are sufficient for a Circus process to be both deadlock and divergencefree:
(i) It is sequential.
(ii) It is free from hiding.
(iii) It doesn't mention Stop or Chaos.
(iv) All internal and external choices are over non-empty sets. Expanding the schemas, we must prove that
which is true, since both N and ProcID are non-empty. Finally, condition (viii) follows trivially from the construction of the actions from the total, but arbitrary state change ∆AProtNatState: all actions have true guards and never abort. 2
Now, if we can prove that
ProtNat is a refinement of AProtNat, then we can conclude that ProtNat is also deadlock-free and divergence-free. Moreover, the main action of ProtNat must also preserve the state invariants, otherwise AProtNat would not be divergence-free. We state and prove that ProtNat is a refinement of AProtNat in Theorem 3.2, which will make use of the following three laws 5 .
Law 1 is about the refinement of internal choices over a number of prefixed actions. Using this law, the internal choice can be transformed to an external choice over a number of guarded actions. Law 1 Suppose, for i ∈ I , that c i is a channel, that S i and T i are subsets of the communicable values over c i , that T i is non-empty, that A i and B i are actions over a common state, that g i is a boolean-valued expression over the state, and that pre is an assertion about the state. Then
The assumption {pre} is used to record the abstract action's precondition; it does nothing if pre is true, and aborts otherwise. 2
Law 2 applies to guarded prefixed actions. Simply, the law states that if the action does engage in a communication with its environment, then the guard (g) and the communicated value (x ) are in scope for that part of the action which follows the communication.
Law 2
Suppose that A is an action, g is a guard over A's state, c is a channel, and S is a subset of c's communicable values.
Law 3 states the necessary conditions for the refinement of a schema operation into an assignment statement.
Law 3
Suppose that Op is a schema operation over a state with variables x and w , that e is an expression with the same type as x , and that pre is an assertion over the variables in scope.
Op
The notation S [ y := f ] denotes the predicate S , with f systematically substituted for y. 2
Using Laws 1-3, we can now show that ProtNat is indeed a refinement of AProtNat.
Theorem 3.2 ProcID = ∅ ⇒ AProtNat ProtNat
Proof. From [5] , and since AProtNat and ProtNat have the same state, this refinement holds provided that Finally, we can now achieve our main goal for this example and show that the process ProtNat is free from deadlock and divergence.
Theorem 3.3 If ProcID = ∅, then ProtNat is deadlock-and divergence-free.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorems 3.1-3.2 2
Example 2: Production Cell
The Production Cell is a realistic case study from industry, representing an actual installation used in a metal factory. The system is of moderate complexity and can modelled by a finite automaton with a number of states in the order of 10 12 [8] . As illustrated in Figure 3 , the Production Cell system comprises six machines, working concurrently: a feed belt, an elevating table, a robot, a press, a deposit belt, and a crane.
From the perspective of a metal plate, the general sequence of production is:
-The feed belt transports a metal plate to the table.
-The table elevates and rotates so that the robot can pick up the plate.
-The robot picks up the plate with its first arm, then turns anticlockwise and feeds the metal plate into the press.
-The press forges the plate and returns to bottom position in order to unload. -The robot picks up the plate from the press with its second arm, then rotates further to unload the plate on the deposit belt.
-The deposit belt transports the plate to the travelling crane.
-The crane picks up the metal plate from the deposit belt, moves to the feed belt, and then unloads the metal plate; a new cycle begins.
This sequence is further complicated by the fact that the robot can go back to the table and pick up a metal plate while the press is forging another one.
In [1] we have provided a formal model of the Production Cell in Circus. We have also used the above proof-by-refinement technique to prove that the proposed model is divergence-free. Due to space limitations, we cannot detail the full Circus model of the Production Cell or the formal proof conducted. Nonetheless, as another example of using the proof-by-refinement technique, we here present the Circus model of the feed belt machine, and prove that it is free from deadlock and divergence. The process is depicted in Figure 4 and can be described as follows:
Global Definitions
At any moment of time, either there is no plate on the belt, there is a plate on the belt but it has not reached the extreme end of the belt, or there is a plate exactly at the extreme end of the belt 6 . The feed belt receives a metal plate from the crane, an event signalled by synchronisation on the channel start, and transports it to the other end, where it can drop it to elevating table.
Process State
The state of the feed belt is described with only one variable, fb.
Process Actions
The constituent actions of the process are (i) InitFeedBeltState: Initially the feed belt is carrying no plates.
(ii) LoadFeedBelt: This action is enabled only when there is no plate on the belt. The arrival of a new plate to the belt is indicated by the synchronisation event on the channel start. The effect of the action is to change the status of the feed belt accordingly.
(iii) TransferPlate: This action is enabled only when there is a plate that is not at the extreme end of the feed belt. The effect of the action is to transfer that plate to the extreme end of the belt.
(iv) UnloadFeedBelt: The second action is unloading a plate to the table, an event signalled by a communication on the channel drop. The action is enabled only when there is a plate at the extreme end of the belt. The effect of this action is to change the state variable to indicate that there is no longer a plate on the belt.
Thus, the processing sequence of the feed belt is: load a plate, transfer it to the extreme end, then unload the plate to the table. This sequence is repeated indefinitely. An interesting remark on the FeedBelt process, is that can be expressed as a sequential composition where the postcondition of each action in that sequential composition guarantees the guards of the following action. Also, the guards of each action guarantee the preconditions of that action. We formalise these remarks as a lemma 7 , as we will need it in a later stage of this paper.
Lemma 3.4
Let Main be the main action of the FeedBelt process. Then, Main can be expressed as:
-For all i , pre i contains no dashed variables, and post i contains no undashed variables.
Furthermore, the following properties hold for g i , pre i , and post i
Proof.
Straightforward, by inspection of the process' actions. 2
Now, to show that the FeedBelt is deadlock-free and divergence-free, we start by defining an abstract model (AFeedBelt) of the process. Again, the abstract model ( Figure 5 ) has the same structure, state components, types and invariants. It also uses the same channels, and with similar actions, except that this time there are no guards.
Theorem 3.5
The abstraction AFeedBelt is both deadlock-free and divergencefree.
which is true, since BeltStatus is non-empty. Finally, condition (viii) follows trivially since all actions have no guards and true preconditions.
2
We state and prove that FeedBelt is a refinement of AFeedBelt in Theorem 3.6 -consequently, this means that the FeedBelt process is also deadlock-free and divergence-free. The theorem makes use of the following laws: Law 4 Suppose that A is an action, g is a guard over A's state, and pre is an assumption over that state.
If pre does not hold, both actions above abort. If pre does hold then the introduction of the guard has no effect, as g is guaranteed by pre.
Law 5
Suppose that A is an action, g is a guard over A's state, and pre 1 and pre 2 are assumptions over that state.
If pre 1 does not hold, both actions above abort. If pre 1 does hold then the µ expression is guaranteed to be entered at least once; pre 1 guarantees g. Now, if pre 2 holds then the cycle defined by the µ expression is repeated; again the introduction of the guard has no effect as g is guaranteed by pre 2 . If pre 2 does not hold at the end of any cycle, then both of the µ expressions abort. That is, the updates on the state can be expressed as an assumption for the following actions. We now show that the FeedBelt process is free from the risks of deadlock and divergence. 
Conclusions
Formal proofs that a specification satisfies a certain property are valuable yet challenging. Using "abstraction" and "refinement" as the guiding principles, we have introduced a proof-by-refinement technique that can facilitate reasoning about properties of system specifications. The key idea is to show that the specification is a refinement of a more abstract model, in which the proofs are much easier to conduct. Of course, it is important here that the properties considered are preserved be the refinement relation. Otherwise, proving that an abstract model A satisfies a property P, and that A S , does not necessitate that S also satisfies P.
Similar ideas for proof-by-refinement can be traced in the literature. In CSP, for example, a process P can be proved to be deadlock free if it is a refinement of the process NeverDeadlock = µ X • b : αP → X . Our approach is different in the sense that it can consider both state and behaviour refinement and it does not explicitly appeal to the formal semantics of the specification language concerned. Instead, the details of the semantic model are hidden away through the use of refinement laws. We are then left with the side conditions for these laws, which need to be discharged. These side conditions are in the form of Z or, indeed, first order logic. Thus, in effect, the logical framework of the proofs is independent of the semantic model of the specification language. This allows for elegant proofs that are more readable, and hence understandable; try, for example, to do prove the same properties of ProtNat using the formal semantics [12] of Circus 8 . Also, Z is already an established notation in both academia and industry, with no lack of tool support. Thus, Z tools can now be applied in a domain where they previously have been thought to be ineffective; that is, reasoning about concurrent systems.
Here, and in [1, 3] , we have successfully applied the proof-by-refinement technique to different examples, ranging from simple processes like ProtNat to complex systems like the Production Cell. Though all our experiments are with Circus specifications, it should be clear that the technique is not limited to a particular specification language. Steps i-iii in Section 1 are general and can be employed for other specification languages and refinement techniques. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that more experience is needed, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the technique and the conditions that control its application.
A Proofs
Lemma A.1 In Theorem 3.2, proving that AProtNat is refined by ProtNat requires us to prove that: = { by set theory, propositional calculus, and using readers = ∅ } readers ∪ writers = ∅ ∧ id ∈ ProcID ∧ d ∈ N ∧ ProtNatState ⇒ true Hence, the application of Law 3 is valid, and the result follows. 2
